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Analysis of the EPD&C/EPG Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
a--_roac_ features a o_6p-o_n'a-nal_is of the-_dware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results corresponding to the Orbiter
Electrical Power Distribution and Control (EPD&C)/Electrical
Power Generation (EPG) hardware.
The EPD&C/EPG hardware is required for performing critical func-
tions of cryogenic reactant storage, electrical power generation
and product water distribution in the Orbiter. Specifically, the
EPD&C/EPG hardware consists of the following components:
o Power Section Assembly (PSA)
o Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS)
o Thermal Control Subystem (TCS)
o Water Removal Subsystem (WRS)
o Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System (PRSDS)
The IOA analysis process utilizedlavailable EPD&C/EPG hardware
drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies,
components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was
evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects.
Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect
for each failure mode.
Figure i presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the five major subdivisions of the EPD&C/EPG. A summary of
the number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented
below with Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F)
criticality second.
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For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical _ Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
+ • +
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality : I 1/1











The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS
Office has undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for
the Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assesment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL reevaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware
identified in the Space Shuttle independen£FMEA/CIL Assessment
contractor statement of work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external interfaces, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEA/CIL
reevaluation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.0 summarizes the
assessment of the NASA and Prime Contractor FMEAs/CILs that is














Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
i.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem;
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
















Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 EPD&C/EPG Ground Rules and Assumptions
The EPD&C/EPG ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are
defined in Appendix B.
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3.0 SUBSYSTEMDESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The EPD&C/EPG consists of hardware that is required for the
command and control of electrical power generation, FC operation,
and cryogenic reactant distribution and control in the Orbiter.
The EPD&C/EPG consists of the following divisions:
i • The Power Section Assembly (PSA) utilizes the cryogenic
reactants to produce the necessary electrical power for
the Orbiter. By-products of this reaction include
excess water and heat. The PSA is composed of cell
plates, pressure plates, heater/insulator plates, and
cell voltage harnesses. Each stack contains ninety-six
cell plates grouped into three substacks connected in
series. Analog data outputs from each cell are
transmitted to the Orbiter via a cell performance
monitor.
• The Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS) heats the
cryogenic reactants from the PRSDS to an acceptable
temperature for use in the PSA. The RCS delivers
reactants and controls the pressure within the cell
plates• Purging of the inert gases from the reactant
lines is provided along with the circulation of
hydrogen for excess water removal from the PSA. The
RCS is composed of preheaters, reactant regulator,
hydrogen pump-separator, condenser, and reactant
purge/vent lines.
• The Thermal Control System (TCS) controls operating
temperatures and electrolyte concentration in the PSA.
Waste heat is used to condense water vapor• Heat is
also transferred to the preheaters for the reactant




The Water Removal Subsystem (WRS) removes product water
from the PSA during normal operation• The excess water
is produced from water vapor which is converted to a
liquid by the condenser. The WRS delivers the water to
the Orbiter vehicle potable water storage system or to
the water relief line. The WRS consists of the
condenser, hydrogen pump-separator, water trap, water
discharge line, and water purity sensor•
The Power Reactant storage and Distribution System
(PRSDS) stores the cryogenic reactants (hydrogen and
oxygen) for use in the production of electrical power
in the fuel cells. The PRSDS can be configured to























Each tank contains redundant heating elements and
sensors to maintain the gases at the proper pressure.
The PRSDS also provides gases to the Environmental
Control and Life Support System (ECLSS).
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The elements of the EPD&C/EPG are installed in the mid-body of
the Orbiter vehicle beneath the payload bay liner. Each of the
three fuel cells are located in the forward part of the bay, with
FCP 1 on the left-hand side, with FCP 2 and FCP 3 located forward
and aft, respectively on the right-hand side. Each of the PRSDS
cryogenic reactant storage tanks are located along the outer
edges of the payload bay under the liner. Cryogenic reactants
(oxygen and hydrogen) are transferred on demand to the FCP and
oxygen is transported directly to the ECLSS. Crew command and
control is achieved via switches, circuit breakers, or meters
located in the Orbiter cabin. Product water from the PSA is
transported to the ECLSS for storage and waste heat is rejected
to the cooling system. Three-phase AC electrical power is
received from the Orbiter by the FCP to power the coolant pump,
hydrogen pump-separator, and the water purity sensor. DC power
generated by the FCP is distributed by the EPD&C. Reference
Figure 5.
3.3 Hierarchy
Figure 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the EPD&C/EPG hardware and
the corresponding subcomponents. Figures 3 through 6 comprise





























































































































































Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities for each of the two major subdivisions
of the EPD&C/EPG. Further discussion of each of these
subdivisions and the applicable failure modes is provided in
subsequent paragraphs.








































Of the 262 failure modes analyzed, no single failures were
determined to result in loss of crew or vehicle, and 60 were
determined to result in loss of mission. A summary of the
potential critical items is presented in Table II. Appendix D
presents a cross reference between each potential critical item
(PCI) and a specific worksheet in Appendix C.
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4.1 Analysis Results - Power Section Assembly
The Power Section Assembly produces the electrical power
necessary for the Orbiter vehicle operation. There are fifty-
three failure modes identified for this division. Of these, two
are criticality 2/IR, eleven are criticality 3/IR, ode is _
criticality 3/2R, and thirty-nine are criticality 3/3. Three
failures from the PSA are identified to be PCI's. These are
listed in Appendix D.
4.2 Analysis Results - Reactant Control Subsystem _
The Reactant Control Subsystem (RCS) provides the cryogenic
reactants to the PSA at an acceptable pressure and temperature.
There are slxty-five failure modes identified for this division.
Of these, fourteen are criticality 3/1R, twenty-four are
criticality 3/2R, and twenty-seven are criticality 3/3. Ten
failures from the RCS are identified to be PCI's. These are
listed in Appendix D.
4.3 Analysis Results - Thermal Control System
The Thermal Control System (TCS) controls operating temperatures
and electrolyte concentration in the PSA. There are thirteen
failure modes identified for this division. Of these, three are
criticality 2/IR, one is criticality 3/IR, and nine are
criticality 3/3. Three failures from the TCS are identified to
be PCI's. These are listed in Appendix D.
4.4 Analysis Results - Water Removal Subsystem
The Water Removal Subsystem (WRS) removes product water from the
FCP during normal operation. There are seventy-five failure
modes identified for this division. Of these, nineteen are
criticality 2/IR, twenty-five are criticality 3/IR, two are
criticality 3/2R, and twenty-nine are criticality 3/3. Twenty
failures from WRS are identified to be PCI's. These are listed
in Appendix D.
4.5 Analysis Results - Power Reactant Storage and
Distribution System_
The Power Reactant Storage and Distribution System (PRSDS) stores
the cryogenic reactants for use in the FCP to produce electrical
power. There are fifty-six failure modes identified for this
division. Of these, four are criticality i/i, twelve are
criticality 2/IR, thirty-four are criticality 3/IR, and six are
criticality 3/3. Twenty-four failures from PRSDS are identified



























Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used














JSC-12820, PCN-1, STS Operational Flight Rules,
12-16-85
V45 File III, Operations and Maintenance Requirements
and Specifications Document- Orbiter OMRSD- Electrical
Power Generation/Power Reactant Storage and
Distribution, 5-29-86
NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL), 10-10-86
100-2G, Rockwell International Reliability Desk
Instruction Flight Hardware FMEA and CIL, 1-31-84
Orbiter Fuel Cell Powerplant Review and Training
Course, International Fuel Cells (IFC), 5-86
JSC-II174, Space Systems Handbook, Rev. C, DCN-5,
9-13-95
VS70-976102, Integrated System Schematic - Orbiter
Vehicle OV-102 EPDC, Rev. F, 7-2-86
VS70-945099, Integrated System Schematic - Orbiter
vehicle 0V-099, 103, & 104, Electrical Power Subsystem
(EPS), 7-18-85
VS70-945102, Integrated System Schematic - Orbiter













OV-102, Flt 7 and
subs
0V-099, Flt 1-3 only
OV-102, Flt 1-4 only
or-102, Flt 6






































AOA - Abort Once Around
ATO - Abort To Orbit
CIL - Critical Items List
CRIT - Criticality
C&W - Caution and warning System
ECLSS - Environmental Control and Life Support System
EPD&C - Electrical PowerDistribution and Control
EPG - Electrical Power Generation
FCP - Fuel Cell Powerplant
FC - Fuel Cell
FMEA - Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
FSSR - Flight System Software Requirement
GAS - Get Away Special
GPC - General Purpose Computer
GSE - Ground Support Equipment
HDC - Hybrid Driver Controller
IOA - Independent Orbiter Assessment
MDAC - McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
MDM - Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NA - Not Applicable
NSTS - National Space Transportation System
OF - Operational Forward
OMRSD - Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
Document
- Power Control Assembly
- Potential Critical Item
- Primary Landing Site
- Power Section Assembly
- Program Requirements Control Board
















- Remote Power Controller
- Return To Landing Site
- Space Transportation System
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Thermal Control Subsystem

































Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions

















DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the _-0-[lowing
a--mplifications and addit o_.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
%-60PS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
%-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_-_nsition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
p-l-_ed end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest cri£icality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
__MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(ops)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
B-2
MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or eve-_ of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the'standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up "an-_ds at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transiti_o-ut of OPS i (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at r_ition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and en_at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ens--_ith the completion of post-landlng






























DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, I00-_ober 1986, was empioye--a--with the






The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown•
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
L
B-4
. All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail•
• Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required ....
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
, The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest•
•
RATIONALE: Assigning phase c;iticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed,
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
i0. Analysis of welds or brazed Joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
ii. Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to



























DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
EPD&C/EPG-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
l • Component age life will not be considered in the
analysis.
RATIONALE: Component age analysis is beyond the
scope of this task.
• An 02 cryo tank will be assumed lost if both heaters in
one tank fail to function (i.e., neither heater will
function with the delta current sensors enabled).
RATIONALE: Systems failure definition.
rule definition.
Flight
• An H2 cryo tank will be assumed lost if neither heater
in one tank will function.
RATIONALE: Systems failure definiton. Flight
rule definition•
• An impending loss of all cryo 02 or all cryo H2 tanks
will be cause to exercise the highest-priority abort
mode the loss/leak will allow.
RATIONALE: Flight rule definition.
• Continue nominal ascent if 2/3/4 02 (H2) tanks fail
when flying 3/4/5.
Enter next PLS daily go/no-go if two 02 (H2) tanks fail
during llft-off and on-orbit.
RATIONALE: Flight rules go/no-go criteria.
• A fuel cell will be considered failed if the following
conditions exist•
a. Coolant pump or H2 pump/H20 separator is lost.
b. Coolant pressure >75 (71.4) PSIA and increasing•
Co Fuel cell unable to discharge water to the ECLSS
H20 storage tanks or overboard via the fuel cell
H20 relief system.
d. Fuel cell reactant valve fails closed.
e. Cannot be connected to a main bus.
B-6
w
f. Fuel cell 02 reaction chambers cannot be purged.
i0.
g. Fuel cell end-cell heater failing on.
Loss of two fuel cells in the first stage of ascent is
considered loss of life/vehicle,
RATIONALE: SRB loads are too high for one fuel
cell to support, voltage may go <25v
which will shut down the GPC's.
ii. Although the ECLSS product-water storage is a separate
system from EPD&C/EPG, it will be considered as a
failable redundant product-water relief line for
purposes of the EPG functional criticality scenarios.
RATIONALE: This assumption violates general
ground rule 2.3.2.d in NSTS 22206 but
is essential for evalua__q_l-ures
associate4 with £he Water relief line.
12.
13.
The start/sustaining heater on the left-hand FCP (FCP
#i) is assumed to be disconnected. Thus, this FCP
cannot be maintained operational at no-load, and will
be considered shutdown if the load cannot be maintained
at greater than 2 KW.
RATIONALE: Load needed to maintain operating
temperature. RH FCP uses sustain
heater to maintain temps atno-load.
For all "failed open" failure modes for valves which
are normally open, redundancy screen B will be assumed
failed.
RATIONALE: The failure is not detectable until
.......... thee valve is required to be closed.
14. Five 02 and H2 tanks are being used as the baseline
configuration under study.
RATIONALE: The Configuration for all redundant
components is being considered for
this analysis.
15. Inadvertant Fuel Cell shutdown during RTLS and TAL
abort is considered loss of crew/vehicle.
RATIONALE: Loss of FCP i/Main Bus A is loss of
OMS Engine Purge Capability (required
for TAL) and Aft Compartment MPS





















This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, i00ctobe-{Y986. Finally, effects are entered at-_he
5-_to--m--6f-_ach sheet_-_d the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.






1 - Loss of life or vehicle
2 - Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 - All others
Functional Criticalities:
IR - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of llfe or vehicle.
2R - Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 - Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 - Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 - Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA - Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P - Passed Screen
F - Failed Screen


















































SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2,3 START/STOP CONTROL
FAIL TO TRANSFER, FAIL TO CONDUCT, FAIL TO CLOSE














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIA2SI6, 32V73AIA2SI7, 32V73AIA2SI8
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7355
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO START A FUEL CELL. MULTIPLE FAILURES WOULD
HAVE TO OCCUR BEFORE LOSS OF MISSION/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-2
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 2001 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM: SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2,3 START/STOP CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS, INADVERTENTLY CLOSES












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




ME452-0102-7355 _ - _
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONA_ _-........ ...... _......
INABILITY TO SHUT DOWN ACTIVE FUEL CELL. ALTERNATE METHODS OF FCP






















































RESISTORS A2R6, A2R7, A2RI4, A2R3
CRITICALITIES


























REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-4
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT






























RESISTORS AIR35, AIR22, A2RI3_
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ..... MORT










REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [ P] c[p]
LOCATION: 32V73AIA2AIR35, 22, A2RI3
PART NUMBER: RWRSOSi211FR ....
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
LOSS OF ABILITY TO START FCP OR RESTART A SHUTDOWN FCP, OR TO





















REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-5
m
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST














RESISTORS AIR35, AIR22, A2RI3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]








































RESISTORS AIR4, AIR13, A2RIO
CRITICALITIES

















CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK .................. -.....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO START/STOP FCP. REDUNDANT FCP SHUTDOWN PATHS


































PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
























































CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK
EFFECTS/_TIONATR:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO ST_T/STOP FCP. REDUNDANT FCP SHUTDOWN PATHS








































PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST














RESISTORS A2R8, AIR17, A2RII
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: 32V73AIA2A2R8, AIRIT, A2RII












REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-10
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 2009 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2 & 3 CONTROLLER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAIL TO CONDUCT, FAIL TO CLOSE













PNL 014, 015, 016



















CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/  iONALE:
LOSS OF ASSOCIATED FUEL CELL; LOSS OF REDUNDANCY AT FCP LEVEL.







































SWITCH, FUEL CELL 1,2 & 3 CONTROLLER
SHORTS, INADVERTANTLY CLOSES













PNL 014, 015, 016
SWITCH S12, SII, SII
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:






















































PNL 014, 015, 016
RESISTOR ASRI, ASRI, A6RI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R







CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ASSOCIATED FUEL CELL. LOSS OF REDUNDANCY AT FCP LEVEL.

































PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST













PNL 014, 015, 016
RESISTOR A5RI, A5RI, A6RI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI4ASRI, AISASRI, AI6A6RI
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR






REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-14
INDEPENIDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2013 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, FUEL CELL NO 1 START UP HEATER
FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE FAILURES.





































CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


































SWITCH, FC NO 2,3, STARTUP HEATER
FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAIL TO CONDUCT, FAIL TO CLOSE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO INHIBIT A FCP HEATER. EVENTUAL LOSS OF FCP
AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE WITH MULTIPLE FCP FAILURES.
REFERENCES:
i

















SWITCH, FC NO 2,3, STARTUP HEATER
SHORTS, INADVERTENTLY CLOSES














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
•DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO INHIBIT A FCP HEATER. EVENTUAL LOSS OF FCP



















































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFFz 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3







CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE (STARTUP HEATER DISCONNECTED ON FCP I).
REFERENCES:































FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI_OFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/iR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 32 V73AI2AIATRI, A8RI
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI2 IIFR
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES CURRENT PROTECTION FROM CONT BUS'S TO FCP'S. LOSS OF



































PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
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_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI2AIA6R2, A7R2, A8R2
P_T _MBER: R_07C512GR





















































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
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3) MID PCA 1,2,3

























LOCATION: 40V76A25AIRI4, 6AIR14, 7AIR13
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI2 IIFR ........
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :






















































DIODES AICR9, i0, i0, 9, i0, 9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:











LOCATION: 40V76A25AICR9, I0 (REF)
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY FOR VEHICLE COMMANDS TO CONTROL START POWER TO
ASSOCIATED FCP. REDUNDANCY AT SUBSYTEM LEVEL. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO MULTIPLE FCP FAILURES.
REFERENCES: ALSO DIODES 40V76A26AICRI0, AICR9 AND
40V76A27AICRI0, AICR9
u
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SHORT (DOES NOT BLOCK)













DIODES AICR9, i0, i0, 9, i0, 9
CRITICALITIES
















CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALEZ
NONE.
REFERENCES: ALSO DIODES 40V76A26AICRI0, AICR9 AND
40V76A27AICRI0, Ai_9



















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2024 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I, AR9, AR8, AR8
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENT OPEN,
SHORT TO GROUND




3) MID PCA 1,2,3







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VEHICLE COMMANDS TO HDC TO START ASSOCIATED FCP.
REDUNDANCY AT SUBSYSTEM LEVEL. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
AFTER LOSS OF MULTIPLE FCP.
REFERENCES:
w












HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I, ARg, ARS, AR8
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS




3) MID PCA 1,2,3

























CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHO_, S_L FAILURE _ _ .........









































3) MID PCA 1













REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [







] C [ ]























SHORT (DOES NOT BLOCK)




3) MID PCA 1









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT










REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25AICRII, 12, 13, 14
JANTXV IN4246
































































DEORBI T" 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3






B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26AICRI4, 13, 12, ii
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
























SHORT (DOES NOT BLOCK)

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] c C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A26AICRI4, 13, 12, Ii
JANTXVIN4246






































































REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27AICRI4, 13, 12, Ii
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
























SHORT (DOES NOT B_CK)























_D_D_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B C ] cc ]
_CATION:
P_T _MBER:
40V76A27AICRI4, 13, 12, ii
J_TXV IN4246
















































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 2032 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I, ARI0, ii, 9, i0,
9, i0
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENT OPEN,
SHORT TO GROUND














HDC ARI0, Ii, 9, I0, 9, i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF VEHICLE COMMAND AND MANUAL CAPABILITY (SWITCH S16) TO
STOP ASSOCIATED FCP. REDUNDANCY AT CIRCUIT LEVEL.
REFERENCES: 40V76A26ARg, ARI0, 40V76A27ARg, ARI0
w
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HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE i, ARI0, ii, 9, i0,
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS














HDC ARI0, ii, 9, i0, 9, i0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_JNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25AR10, 11 (REF)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz _ _ _i_ i_ _
LOSS OF VEHICLE COMMAND AND MANUAL CAPABILITY (SWITCH S16) TO
STOP ASSOCIATED FCP. REDUNDANT HDC INHIBITS FCP SHUTDOWN.

































ITEM: EVENT INDICATOR, FC READY FOR LOAD
FAILURE MODE: ANY CREDIBLE FAILURE
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2035 ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:














































































ITEM: EVENT INDICATOR, FC GPC PURGE SEQ DSI
FAILURE MODE: ANY CREDIBLE FAILURE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
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SWITCH, TOGGT._ SELECTOR, FCP TEMP.
FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAIL TO CONDUCT, FAIL TO CLOSE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 33V73AIS 3
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7106








































SWITCH, TOGGLE SELECTOR, FCP TEMP.
SHORTS, INADVERTENTLY CLOSES












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3












REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-40
INDEPEND_ O_TER ASSES_
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_NC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3




ITEM: METER, FCP STACK OUTT,_T COOPT TEMP i
FAIL_ MODE: PEGS HIGH OR LOW
r._AD ANALYST: J. PATTON SUBSYS _AD: K. SCHMECKPEPER i
B_AKDOWN HIERARC_:
I) EPG
2) _EL CELL ----








FLIGHT P_E HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C i
PRE_UNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3 --
DEO_IT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3 []
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
_DUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 33V73AIM4
PART _MBER: MC432-0238-0019
B[ ] c[ ] []




















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2040 ABORT:
ITEM: METER, FCP STACK OUTLET COOLANT TEMP
FAILURE MODE: PARAMETER DEVIATION












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 33V73AIM4
PART NUMBER: MC432-0238-0019
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SIGNAL CONDITIONER NO. 1
FULL OUTPUT WITHOUT REGARD TO INPUT














SIGNAL CONDITIONER NO. 1 DSC OMI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V75A23
PART NUMBER: V070-754161











































SIGNAL CONDITIONER NO. 1
ZERO OUTPUT WITH RECORD TO INPUT














SIGNAL CONDITIONER NO. 1 DSC OMI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V75A23
PART NUMBER: V070-754161
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2043 ABORT:
ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONER NO. i
FAILURE MODE: OUT OF TOLERANCE, OUTPUT HIGH OR LOW














SIGNAL CONDITIONER NO. 1 DSC OMI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:


























































SIGNAL CONDITIONER NO. 2
FULL OUTPUT WITHOUT REGARD TO INPUT














SIGNAL CONDITIONER NO. 2 DSC OM2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
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SIGNAL CONDITIONER NO. 2
ZERO OUTPUT WITH REGARD TO INPUT















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3














































SIGNAL CONDITIONER NO. 2
OUT OF TOLERANCE, OUTPUT HIGH OR LOW














SIGNAL CONDITIONER NO. 2 DSC OM2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2047 ABORT:
ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONER DSC OF3


















SIGNAL CONDITIONER DSC OF3 _
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3 __C
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83V75AI8
PART NUMBER: V070-753263








































SIGNAL CONDITIONER DSC OF3
ZERO OUTPUT WITH REGARD TO INPUT












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83V75AI8
PART NUMBER: V070-753263









REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-50
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















SIGNAL CONDITIONER DSC OF3
OUT OF TOLERANCE, OUTPUT HIGH OR LOW
























B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 83V75AI8
PART NUMBER: V070-753263






































ITEM: SIGNAL CONDITIONER DSC OA2
FAILURE MODE: FULL OUTPUT WITHOUT REGARD TO INPUT












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
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SIGNAL CONDITIONER DSC OA2 .....
ZERO OUTPUT WITH REGARD TO INPUT














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:









REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 55V 75A20
PART NUMBER: V070-755262
] B [ ] c [ ]






































SIGNAL CONDITIONER DSC OA2
OUT OF TOLERANCE, OUTPUT HIGH OR LOW












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: "3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
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SWITCH, FUEL CELL GPC PURGE SEQ
FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO













8 ) RCS m
9) 05-6MA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS" 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: INITIATES AUTO-PURGE SEQUENCE CYCLE THROUGH GPC AND
CONDUCTS POWER TO MDM PF2.
EFFECTS: LOSS O?_TY TO AUTOMATICALLY PURGE FUEL CELL THROUGH
THE GPC. MANUAL FC PURGE AVAILABLE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
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ITEM: SWITCH, FUEL CELL GPC PURGE SEQ
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS, INADVERTENTLY CLOSES












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: INITIATES AUTO-PURGE SEQUENCE CYCLE THROUGH GPC AND
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ITEM: RESISTOR, S.IK 1/4 W







































CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
FUNCTION: PROVIDES CURRENT ISOLATION BETWEEN ESS BUS 3AB TO FC
GPC _GE S_CH (Sl). -: _ .....





















RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4 W
PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3







CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES CURRENT ISOLATION BETWEEN ESS BUS 3AB TO FC
















ITEM: SWITCH, FUEL CELL PURGE HEATER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO
CONDUCT














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
_CTION: PROVIDES THE ABILITY TO HEATAUTO_TICpURGE LINE BY
GPC IN CONJUNCTION WITH S1 IN "GPC" POSITION OR MANUALLY IN "ON"
POSITION.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF FC PURGE HTRS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF ABILITY TO






































SWITCH, FUEL CELL PURGE HEATER
SHORTS, INADVERTANTLY CLOSES












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI2AIS2
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7306
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES THE ABILITY TO HEAT AUTOMATIC PURGE LINE BY
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RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4 W
ELEMENT OPENS, HI-RESIST












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 5/IR
DEORBIT: 5/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3






CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES_NT ISOLATION BETWEEN ESS BUS 2CA TO FC
PURGE HTR SWIT_ $2 AND MDM OF4. _
EFFECTS: LOSS OF FC _GE HTR POWER AND ABILITY TO SAFELY PURGE





































RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4 W
PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES CURRENT ISOLATION BETWEEN ESS BUS 2CA TO FC
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CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES _NTISO_TION BETWEEN CONT BUS CA1 AND FC
PURGE HTRSWITCH-(S2)_ _ _!:ii_i i_!!i__i_! _i_ _j_ _J_ _!_ _ _
EFFECTS: LOSS OF ABILITY TO POWER PURGE HTRS CONTROLLED BY SWITCH




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET






PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3







CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES CURRENT ISOLATION BETWEEN CONT BUS CA1 AND FC
PURGE HTR SWITCH ($2).
EFFECTS: NONE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-64
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: ELEMENT OPENS, HI-RESIST












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B C ] C [ ] .....
LOCATION: 32V73AI2AIA2R3
P_T NUMBER: RWR80S1211FR _ .........
CAUSES: cONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES CURRENT ISOLATION BETWEEN CONT BUS BCI AND FC
PURGE HTR SWI-==TCH ($2).
EFFECTS: LOSS OF ABILITY TO POWER P_GE HTRS CONTRO_D BY SWITCH



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2064 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
FAILURE MODE: PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3







CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES CURRENT ISOLATION BETWEEN CONT BUS BCl AND FC
PURGE HTR SWITCH ($2).
EFFECTS: NONE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-66
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
U
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/2R u










2) FUEL CELL --
3) PNL RI2AI







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICALCAUSES:
SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES CURRENT ISOLATION BETWEEN FC PURGE HTR SWITCH
($2) AND MDM OF4 AND FC GPC PURGE SEQ FLAG (DSI) AND MDM OF4_
EFFECTS: LOSS OF ABILITY TO DO GPC AUTO PURGE FOR FC. MAY RESULT




















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET






PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST



































CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES CURRENT ISOLATION BETWEEN FC PURGE HTR SWITCH
($2) AND MDM OF4 AND FC GPC PURGE SEQ FLAG (DSI) AND MDM OF4.
EFFECTS: NONE.
REFERENCES:












REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 5 AMP
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
























B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAl: .............
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS MAIN A PWR TO STANDBY HEATERS OF PURGE LINE
H_ _EN SWITCH $2 IN "ON" _SITI_. ....
EFFECTS: LOSS OF STANDBY HTRS OF 02 AND H2 PURGE LINES. ALTERNATE




































REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 5AMP
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25RPC25
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS MAIN A PWR TO STANDBY HEATERS OF PURGE LINE
HTRS WHEN SWITCH $2 IN "ON" POSITION.
EFFECTS: NONE.
REFERENCES:














_MOTE PO_R CON_OL_R, 5 _P
_SS OF O_PUT, FAI_ TO CONDUCT, INADVERT_TLY



























A[ i] B[P] C [P]
40V76A27RPCI4
MC450-0017-I050
_USES: STRUC_L FAIL_, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, THE_AL SHOCK,
VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
EFFECTS: _SS OF PRIMLY HT_ OF 02 _D H2 _GE LINE.
































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET





REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 5 AMP
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3


























REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 5 AMP
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27RPCI5
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I050
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECTS: LOSS OF PRIMARY HTRS OF 02 AND H2 PURGE LINE.


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET





REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 5 AMP
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27RPCI5
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I050





REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-74
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 5 AMP
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
































CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECTS: LOSS OF PRIMARY HTRS OF O2 AND H2 PURGE LINE.




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2074 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER, 5 AMP
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3



































2) FUEL CELL m
3) PCA-I






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40VV6A2SA2CRg, 40W6A25A2CRI0
PeT _MBEa: JANTXVIN424_ ....
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE,
FUNCTION: POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO INABILITY FOR BOTH
REDUNDANT PATHS TO PURGE FC.
EFFECTS: LOss OF ABILITY TO MONI_R RPC GPC PURGE STATUS.





























SHORT (DOES NOT BLOCK)












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25A2CR9, 40V76A25A2CRI0
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246








REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-78
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















RESISTOR, 2.2K & 1.8K
ELEMENT OPENS, HI-RESIST






















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET





RESISTOR, 2.2K & 1.8K
PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST








































MDAC ID: 2079 ABORT:
ITEM: RESISTOR, 2.2K & 1.8K
FAILURE MODE: ELEMENTS OPENS, HI-RESIST


















RESISTORS AIR12, AIR11, AIRIO, AIR9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHKSE HD-W_C .... ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26AIRI2, AIR11 40V76A26AIRI0, AIR9
PART NUMBER: RLRO-7 C_i82GR _
CAUSES:
SHOCK




































RESISTOR, 2.2K & 1.8K
PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST














RESISTORS AIR12, AIR11, AIR10, AIR9
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ i] B[F] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A26A2CRII, 40V76A26A2CRI2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246 ......
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
E?FECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO MONITER RPC GPC PURGE STATUS. ALTERNATE











































SHORT (DOES NOT BLOCK)











SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3











REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-84
INDEPENDE}_T ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP
FAILURE MODE: OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MONITERING OF HEATER STATUS WHEN GPC AUTO PURGE IS







































CIRCUIT BREAKER, FC #i THERMAL
OPEN












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA; 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 31V73A4CB65, 31V73A4CB66, 31V73A4CB67
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF PUMP MOTOR. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF NECESSARY POWER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-86
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: SWITCH, FUEL CELL PURGE VALVES
FAILURE MODE: FAI_ TO TRANSFER, FAILS TO CLOSE, FAI_ TO
CONDUCT












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
_TION: 32V73AI2AIS3, 32V73AI2AIS4, 32V73AI2AIS5
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7306
CAUSES: STRUC_L FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
_DUNDANCY IN CIR_IT _VEL SO ADDITIONAL FAIL_S WOULD HAVE TO

















_PORT DATE 12/18/86 C-87
=u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: SWITCH, FUEL CELL PURGE VALVES
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS, INADVERTENTLY CLOSES












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:






REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-88
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2W
FAILURE MODE: OPEN

















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDWfFUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEO_IT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI2AIA3RI, 32V73AI2AIA3R2
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MANUAL PURGE CAPABILITY OF FC i.

























RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2W
PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST,












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI2AIA3RI, 32V73AI2AIA3R2
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR





REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-90
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT





























FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/  IONA i
CONDUCTS VEHICLE COMMANDS TO FC 1 PURGE VALVE SWITCH $3 FROM MDM-





































PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST,












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





















HYBRID DRIVER CONTROL_R TYPE III ARI, AR2
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENT OPEN,































CAUSES: THE_AL STRESS, VIB_TION, CONTAMINATION, MEC_ICAL
SHOCK, STRU_L FAIL_
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
LOSS OF REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO 02 AND H2 PURGE VALVES OF FCP





















REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-93
i
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III ARI, AR2
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3










REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-94
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 2093 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR3, AR4
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENT OPEN,
SHORT TO GROUND
































CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REMOTE POWER APPLICATION TO THE 02 AND H2 PURGE VALVES
FOR FC i. POSSIBLE DEGRADED FC PERFORMANCE AND EVENTUAL LOSS OF



































HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR3, AR4
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTINUOUS OPEN OF 02 AND H2 PURGE VALVE OF FC 1 CAUSING
















CIRCUIT BREAKER, FC #2 THERMAL














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/iR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 31V73A4CB68, 31V73A4CB69, 31V73A4CB70
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2030 - • .............
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE= ...............






































RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2W
OPEN


























B [NA ] C [ P ]
32V73AI2AIA4RI, 32V73AI2AIA4R2
RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MANUAL PURGE CAPABILITY OF FC 2. DEGRADATION OF FCP





REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-98
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2W
FAILURE MODE: PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST,
SHORTS























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: 32V73AI2AIA4RI, 32V73AI2AIA4R2
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK ....



























































FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONDUCTS VEHICLE COMMANDS TO FC 2 PURGE VALVE SWITCH $4 FROM MDH-
OF4. POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO DEGRADED FCP PERFORMANCE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-100
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST,
SHORTS



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: 32V73AI2AIA4R3
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES:
SHOCK

















REFERENCES : i ="U
















HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE III, ARI, AR2
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENT OPEN,












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO 02 AND H2 PURGE VALVES OF FCP
2 WHEN $4 IS IN "GPC" POSITION. ALTERNATE PATHS AVAILABLE TO
POWER HDC.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-I02
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE III, ARI, AR2
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_D_G/SA_NG: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION MECHANICAL

























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2102 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE III, AR3, AR4
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENT OPEN,
SHORT TO GROUND












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO 02 AND H2 PURGE VALVE OPERATION WHEN FCP PURGE
VALVE SWITCH $4 IS IN OPEN POSITION. DEGRADATION OF FCP OUTPUT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-i04
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 2103 ABORT: 3/2R
HYBRIDITEM: DRIV_ CONTROLLER, TYPE III, AR3, AR4
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS
PREMATURELY












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26AR3, 40V76A26AR4
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-002
CAUSES: THE_AL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUC_L I_AILURE ....
EFFECTS/RATIONA_ : ......
CONTINUOUS OPEN OF 02 AND H2 PURGE VALVE OF FCP 2 CAUSING







































ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER, FC #3 THERMAL
FAILURE MODE: OPEN












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:














CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PUMP MOTOR WILL FAIL. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS
OF NECESSARY POWER.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-I06
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2W _ .......-
FAILURE MODE: OPEN












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI2AIA5RI, 32V73AI2AIA5R2
PART NUMBER: RWR80SI211FR _' _ _ _
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATi NAU "
LOSS OF MANUAL PURGE CAPABILITY OF FC 3. DEGRADATION OF FCP







































RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2W
PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST,





































REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-I08
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K, i/4W
FAILURE MODE: OPEN












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: 32V73AI2AIASR3
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR _
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONDUCTS VEHICLE COMMANDS TO FC 3 PURGE VALVE SWITCH $4 FROM MDM-









































PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST,


































REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-II0
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 2109 ABORT: 3/2R
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE III, ARI, AR2
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENT OPEN,
SHORT TO GROUND
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
40V76A27ARI, 40V76A27AR2
MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO 02 AND H2 PURGE VALVES OF FCP


























HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE III, ARI, AR2
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27ARI, 40V76A27AR2
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002





REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-I12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2111 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE III, AR3, AR4
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENT OPEN,
SHORT TO GROUND























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION" 40W6A2V R3,40VV6A2  4
PART MBER: MC4VV-0263-0002
c[P]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUC_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONA_ :
LOSS OF POWER TO 02 AND H2 PURGE VALVE OPERATION WHEN FCP PURGE





















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET






HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE III, AR3, AR4
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/2R
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/2R
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/2R ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTINUOUS OPEN OF 02 AND H2 PURGE VALVE OF FCP 3. POSSIBLE




REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-I14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT







ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP .....
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, INADVERTENTLY OPENS




3) PCA-1, PCA-2, PCA-3









FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:















CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL .......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF INPUT POWER (MAIN C) TO GPC AUTO PATH OF PURGE HDC.













































3) PCA-I, PCA-2, PCA-3


























B [NA ] C [ P ]
40V76A25F2, 40V76A25F2, 40V76A25F2
ME451-0018-0300
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF INPUT POWER (MAIN C) TO GPC AUTO PATH OF PURGE HDC.


















ITEM: FUSES, H2 AND 02 FLOWMETER PROTECTION
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, INADVERTANTLY OPENS













PCA I, 2, 3
FUSE FII, F44, F6, F7, F6, F7
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBI T: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
40V76A25F7, F8, 6F6, 6F7, 7F6, 7F7
ME451-0018-0300 _ ............. _...._
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO MONITOR REACTANT F_W_RATES. POSSIBLE LOSS OF







































DIODES, GSE AND VEHICLE ISOLATION
OPEN













PCA 1, 2, 3
DIODES, CR5, CR6, CR7, CR8
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A[ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 40V76A25AICRS, 6, 7, 8, (REF)
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO DRIVE FCP PURGE VALVES DURING MANUAL PURGE
VALVE OPERATION. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
DEGRADATION OF FCP AND LOSS OF NECESSARY ELECTRICAL POWER.
REFERENCES: ALSO DIODES 40V76A26AICRS, 6, 7, 8, 7AICRS, 6, 7, 8
m
u
REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-I18
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODES, GSE AND VEHICLE ISOLATION
SHORT, INTERNAL SHORT, (DOES NOT BLOCK)













PCA i, 2, 3



















6, 7, 8, (REF)
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE
-- _ , _ _ ,_i = _ _ "_





































ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, INADVERTENTLY OPEN




3) MID PCA 1,2,3







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONDUCTS INPUT POWER TO ASSOCIATED FCP CONTROL POWER CIRCUIT.
LOSS OF POWER TO FC COOLANT PUMP. DEGRADATION OF FCPERFORMANCE
AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER MULTIPLE FC FAILURE.
REFERENCES:

































RESISTORS AIR27, AIR25, AIR26
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:















CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE. r

































PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST














RESISTORS AIR27, AIR25, AIR26
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25AIR27 (REF)
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR




REFERENCES: ALSO RESISTORS 40V76A26AIR25, 40V76A27AIR26
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-122
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_C
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 2121 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTRO_R, TYPE III, AR8, _7, _7
FAIL_ MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTANT OPEN,
SHORT TO GRO_D




3) MID PCA 1,2,3







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P_UNCH: 3/3 RT_: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORB_T: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25AR8, 6AR7, 7ART
P_T _MBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: THERMAL ST_SS, VIB_TION, CONTAMINATION, MEC_ICAL
SHOCK, STRUC_L FAIL_
EFFECTS/RATIONA_: .....
LOSS OF F_P VOLTAGE TO COOLANT PUMP AND H2 PUMP, RESULTING IN FCP





































HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE III, AR8, AR7, ART
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS




3) MID PCA 1,2,3







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3










REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-124
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/1R
MDAC ID: 2123 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: DIODE, BLOCKING 3 AMP
FAILURE MODE: OPEN














DIODE CR47, 48, 47, 48, 23, 24
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........
LOSS OF FCP VOLTAGE TO COOLANT PUMP AND H2 PUMP, RESULTING IN FCP

















REFERENCES: ALSO DIODES 40V76A26CR47, CR48, 40V76A27CR23, CR24 i
mm





















DIODE, BLOCKING 3 AMP
SHORT (DOES NOT BLOCK)














DIODE CR47, 48, 47, 48, 23, 24
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: 40V76A25CR47, 48 (REF)
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN5551
] c [ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION)
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: ALSO DIODES 40V76A26CR47, CR48, 40V76A27CR23, CR24
w
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-126
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2125 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I, ARI3, ARI2, _i2
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENT OPEN,
SHORT TO GROUND




3) MID PCA 1,2,3







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT










REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25AR13 (REF)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
B[ ] c [ ]


















































HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I, ARI3, ARI2, ARI2
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS




3) MID PCA 1,2,3







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25ARI3 (REF)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002




REFERENCES: ALSO HDC 40V76A26ARI2, 40V76A27ARI2
w
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-128
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPEI, ARI2
ALL CREDIBLEMODES












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL & THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:


























REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-129
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2128 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I, ARII, ARII
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENT OPEN,
SHORT TO GROUND












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO INHIBIT START-UP HTR.
DEGRADATION AND POSSIBLE FCP LOSS.
FCP OVERHEATS. FCP
REFERENCES:








ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
2129 ABORT: 3/3
HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, TYPE I, ARII, ARII
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:. 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26ARII, TAR11 _:_ ....
PART NUMBER: MC477-0261-0002
CAUSES: THE_AL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:




















REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-131
I '
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















RESISTOR 1.2 KOHM, 2W
ELEMENT OPENS, HI-RESIST




3) MID PCA 1,2,3







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25AIRI3 (REF)
PART NUMBER: RWR80S12 IIFR
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
REFERENCES: ALSO RESISTORS 40V76A26AIRI3, 7AIR13
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-132
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/F_C
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2131 ABORT: 3/3
m
mB
ITEM: _SISTOR 1.2 KOHM, 2W i
FAILU_ MODE: P_ETER DEVIATION, OR OF TO_CE, _-_SIST




2) _EL CELL "
3) MID PCA 1,2,3







FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_C m
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONO_IT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3 m _
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_DUND_CY SC_ENS: A [ ]
_CATION: 40V76A25AIRI3 (REF)
P_T _MBER: R_80S12 IIFR
B [ ] C [ ]
_USES:
SHOCK





_FE_NCES: A_O _SISTORS 40V76A26AIRI3, 7AIR13
mm






















SWITCH, FUEL CELL H20 LINE HTR
FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: WHEN IN AUTO (A) POSITION, PRIMARY HEATER ELEMENTS IN
FC 1,2 & 3 ARE ACTIVATED. WHEN IN AUTO (B) POSITION, SECONDARY
HTR ELEMENTS ARE ACTIVATED.
EFFECTS: ENERGIZES HEATER ELEMENTS OF FC H20 LINE HTR FOR EACH
FC. HTRS USED ONLY DURING STARTUP OF FCP. CAPABILITY TO START A
SHUTDOWN FC DURING FLIGHT HAS NOT BEEN DEMONSTRATED, HOWEVER THE
CAPABILITY DOES EXIST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-134
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: SWITCH, FUEL CELL H20 LINE HTR
FAIL_ MODE: SHORTS, INADVERTENTLY C_SES












FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 T_: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
_NCTION: _N IN AUTO (A) POSITION, PRIMLY HEATER E_MENTS IN
FC 1,2 & 3 _ ACTIVATED. _EN IN AUTO (B) POSITION, SECONDLY




















_PORT DATE 12/17/86 C-135
i
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT













OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS INPUT POWER AND PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION
FOR FC H20 LINE HTR SWITCH ($9) AND THE CORRESPONDING PRIMARY FC
H20 LINE HTR (AUTO A PATH).
EFFECTS: LOSS OF ABILITY TO HEAT PRODUCT H20 LINE. ONLY NEEDED IN
THE EVENT A FCP MUST BE RESTARTED. HEATERS NOT USED DURING NORMAL





REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-136
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[ P] C [P]
LOCATION: 40V76A25F52
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-07500
CAUSES: STRUCTVRAL FAILU_, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL_ __ _: _ _
EFFECTS/RATIONA_ :
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS POWER FRQM M_N BUS A AND PROVIDES CIR_IT _:_
PROTECTION FOR THE HDC AND THE CORRESPONDING PRIMARY FCI H20 LINE
HTR (AUTO A PATH).
EFFECTS: LOSS OF PRIMARY HTR ELEMENTS. NO EFFECT UNLESS A .......
SHUTDOWN FCP HAS TO RESTARTED DURING FLIGHT. THIS CAPABILITY HAS













































FUSE , 3 AMP
OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS POWER AND PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR THE
HDC AND THE PRIMARY FCI H20 LINE HTR (AUTO A PATH).
EFFECTS: LOSS OF PRIMARY HTR ELEMENTS. NO EFFECT UNLESS A
SHUTDOWN FCP HAS TO RESTARTED DURING FLIGHT. THIS CAPABILITY HAS
NEVER BEEN DEMONSTRATED, HOWEVER THE PROCEDURE EXISTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-138
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_C
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 2137 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III, AR7
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND














CRITiCALITIES _ _ i
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3 _ _
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3 m
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25AR7
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATI ONALE :
FUNCTION: PR0VfDES _MOTE_C6NTROL_F_OWERTO PRI_MARY FCI H20
LINE HTR (AUTOi_A_-). _!_-_ _i_ ii_ __-_\_i _'?_ _ _
EFFECTS: LOSS OF PRIMARY HTR ELEMENTS. NO EFFECT UNLESS A
SHUTDOWN FCP_ST0 RESTARTED DURING FLIGHT. THIS CAPABILITY HAS





















HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III, AR7
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS


























B C ] c [ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES REMOTE CONTROL OF PWR TO PRIMARY FCI H20 LINE




REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-140
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL _ _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS POWER AND PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR THE
HDC AND THE SECONDARY FCI H20 LINE HTR (AUTO B PATH). _
EFFECTS: LOSS OF POWER TO SECONDARY HTR ELEMENTS. ONLY USED IN
THE EVENT THAT A FCP MUST BE STARTED PREFLIGHT OR RESTARTED


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 2140 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPER III ARI4
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO SECONDARY FC1 H20
LINE HTR (AUTO B PATH).
EFFECTS: LOSS OF POWER TO SECONDARY HTR ELEMENTS. ONLY USED IN
THE EVENT THAT A FCP MUST BE STARTED PREFLIGHT OR RESTARTED
DURING THE MISSION. THIS CAPABILITY HAS NOT BEEN DEMONSTRATED,
BUT DOES EXIST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-142
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2141 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPER _Ii ARI4
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS
PREMATURELY ......












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3_
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25ARI4
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
BC ] cc ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUC_L_FAILURE ......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ ..........
FUNCTION: PROVIDES REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO SECONDARY FCl H20









































OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS INPUT POWER AND PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION
FOR FC H20 LINE HTR SWITCH ($9) AND THE CORRESPONDING PRIMARY FC
H20 LINE HTR (AUTO A PATH).
EFFECTS: LOSS OF ABILITY TO HEAT PRODUCT H20 LINE. ONLY NEEDED IN
THE EVENT A FCP MUST BE RESTARTED. HEATERS NOT USED DURING NORMAL
OPERATIONS AS TEMPERATURE OF H20 PREVENTS FREEZING.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-144
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
cONTAMINATION, DEGRA-DEDMATERIAL :_ ..........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS INPUT POWER AND PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION
FOR THE HDC AND PRIMARY FC2 H20 LINE HTR (AUTO A PATH).
EFFECTS: LOSS OF ABILITY TO HEAT PRODUCT H20 LINE. ONLY NEEDED IN
THE EVENT A FCP MUST BE RESTARTED. HEATERS NOT USED DURING NORMAL




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2144 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III ARI4
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO PRIMARY FC2 H20
LINE HTR (AUTO A PATH).
EFFECTS: LOSS OF ABILITY TO HEAT PRODUCT H20 LINE. ONLY NEEDED IN
THE EVENT A FCP MUST BE RESTARTED. HEATERS NOT USED DURING NORMAL
OPERATIONS AS TEMPERATURE OF H20 PREVENTS FREEZING.
REFERENCES:












HYBRID DRIVER CONTRO_R TYPE III _14
















FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3 _
_DUND_CY SC_ENS: A [ ]
_CATION: 40V76A26_14
P_T _MBER: MC477-0263-0002
B C ] c C ]
CAUSES: THE_AL ST_SS, VIB_TION, CONT_INATION, MEC_ICAL
SHOCK, STRUC_L FAIL_
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
_CTION: PROVIDES _MOTE CONTROL OF PO_R TO PRIMLY FC2 H20



















































OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS POWERAND PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR HDC
AND SECONDARY FC2 H20 LINE HTR (AUTO B PATH).
EFFECTS: LOSS OF POWER TO SECONDARY HTR ELEMENTS. HTRS ONLY USED
WHEN STARTING A FCP DURING PREFLIGHT OR WHEN RESTARTING A FCP
DURING THE MISSION. THIS CAPABILITY EXISTS, BUT HAS NOT BEEN
DEMONSTRATED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-148
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 2147 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE iII ARI3
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND

















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 3 ]
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC







B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..........................
FUNCTION: PROVIDES REMOTE CONTROL OF POWERTO SECONDARY FC2 H20
LINE HTR (AUTO B PATH).
EFFECTS: LOSS OF POWER TO SECONDARY HTR ELEMENTS. HTRS ONLY USED
WHEN STARTING_AFCP D_NG-PRE?_GHTORWHEN_STARTING A FCP






























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2148 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III ARI3
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS
PREMATURELY












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26ARI3
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO SECONDARY FC2 H20
LINE HTR (AUTO B PATH).
EFFECTS: NONE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-150
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES:_ ......STRUC_RAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK , VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL .... _ _ _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FUNCTION: CONDUCT POWER AND PROVIDE CIRCUIT PROTECTION TO THE HDC
AND PRIMARY FC3 H20 LINE HTR (AUTO A PATH)'_ L _ _:_ z_ii_i_i_i_
EFFECTS: LOSS OF PRIMARY HEATER ELEMENTS. HTRS USED ONLY DURING
FCP STARTUP PREFLIGHT AND DURING FCP RESTART DURING A MISSION.
THE 0N-ORBIT CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP HAS NOT BEEN























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2150 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE iII AR24
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ 1] B[P] C [P]
LOCAT I ON: 40V 75A27AR24
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO PRIMARY FC3 H20
LINE HTR (AUTO A PATH).
EFFECTS: LOSS OF PRIMARY HEATER ELEMENTS. HTRS USED ONLY DURING
FCP STARTUP PREFLIGHT AND DURING FCP RESTART DURING A MISSION.
THE ON-ORBIT CAPABILITY TO RESTART A FCP HAS NOT BEEN
DEMONSTRATED; HOWEVER, PROCEDURES EXIST TO RESTART A SHUTDOWN
FCP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-152
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR24
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS

























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V75A27AR24
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL _
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALEz _
FUNCTION: PROVIDES REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO PRIMARY FC3 H20
LINE HTR (AUTO A PATH).
EFFECTS: NONE.
































ITEM: FUSE, 7.5 AMP
FAILURE MODE: OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCT MAIN BUS POWER AND PROVIDE CIRCUIT PROTECTION





REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-154
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [P ]
LOCATION: 49V75A27F5
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0300
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCT POWER AND PROVIDE CIRCUIT PROTECTION TO THE HDC
AND SECONDARY FC3 H20 LI_ HTR (AUTO B PATH).
EFFECTS: LOSS OF POWER TO SECONDARY HEATER ELEMENTS. HTRS USED
ONLY DURING PREFLIGHT STAR TUP OF FCP AND FOR THE RESTART OF A
SHUTDOWN FCP DURING A MISSION. THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A






















ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: i1/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 2154 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR5
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO SECONDARY FC3 H20
LINE HTR (AUTO B PATH).
EFFECTS: LOSS OF POWER TO SECONDARY HEATER ELEMENTS. HTRS USED
ONLY DURING PREFLIGHT STARTUP OF FCP AND FOR THE RESTART OF A
SHUTDOWN FCP DURING A MISSION. THE CAPABILITY TO RESTART A




REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-156
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT










HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR5
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THE-I_MAL ST_SS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL _
SHOCK, STRUCT_L FAILURE .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO SECONDLY FC3 H20










































OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS POWER AND PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR FC
H20 RELIEF HTR SWITCH SI0 (AUTO A PATH).
EFFECTS: LOSS OF PRIMARY HEATER ELEMENTS OF THE THREE H20 RELIEF
VALVE HTRS, VENT LINE, BARREL AND WATER NOZZLE HEATERS.
REDUNDANCY IN STANDBY HEATERS.
REFERENCES:
u
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-158
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI2AIF4
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DE_RAD_-M_ATERIAL_I i_i i_ _ : .......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS POWER AND PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR FC
H20 RELIEF HTR SWITCH SI0 (AUTO B PATH) .....................
EFFECTS: LOSS OF STANDBY HEATER ELEMENTS OF THE THREE H20 RELIEF
VALVE HTRS, VENT LINE, B_L AND WATER NOZZLE HTRS. LOSS OF FC











































SWITCH, FUEL CELL H20 RELIEF HEATER
FAILS TO TRANSFER, FAILS TO CLOSE, FAILS TO












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DE ORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: IN AUTO (A) POSITION, ENERGIZES THE PRIMARY HTR ELEMENT
OF H20 RELIEF VALVES, H20 VENT LINE, AND H20 BARREL HTR ASSY. IN
AUTO (B) POSITION, ENERGIZES THE SECONDARY HTR ELEMENTS.
EFFECTS: SECONDARY HEATER ELEMENTS AVAILABLE OR EXCESS H20 CAN BE
ROUTED TO H20 SUPPLY STORAGE.
REFERENCES:














SWITCH, FUEL CELL H20 RELIEF HEATER
SHORTS, INADVERTENTLY CLOSES















FLIGHT P_E HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FUNCTION: IN AUTO (A) POSITION, ENERGIZES THE PRIMARY HTR ELEMENT
OF H20 RELIEF VALVES, H20 VENT LINE, AND H20 _L HTR_ASSY ....IN

















































DIODE, 1 AMP BLOCKING
OPEN














DIODE AgCR2, AIOCRI, AIOCR2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI2AIA9CR2, 32V73AI2AIAIOCRI, 32V73AI2AIAIOCR2
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES CONTROL TO HTR CIRCUITRY BY CONTROLLING
COMMANDS FROM FC H20 RELIEF HTR SWITCH SI0 TORESPECTIVE HTR
ELEMENTS. FUNCTION IS DEPENDENT ON SI0 POSITION AUTO (A) OR AUTO
(B).
EFFECTS: LOSS OF FUNCTION RESULTS IN HTR ELEMENT MALFUNCTION IN





REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-162
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE, 1 AMP BLOCKING
SHORT (DOES NOT BLOCK)














DIODE AgCR2, AIOCRI, AI0CR2
: CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
_DUNDANCY SC_ENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI2AIA9CR2, 32V73AI2AIAIOCRI, 32V73AI2AIAIOCR2
__PARTNUMBER: = JANTXVIN4246 ....
MUSES: _ERMAL S_SS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_: ....
_CTION: PROVIDES CONTROL TO HTR CIR_ITRY BY CONTROLLING
COMMANDS FROM FC H20 RELIEF HTR SWITCH SI0 TO_SPECTIVE HTR,_ __
















































RESISTORS, 5.1 K OHM, 1/4 W
OPEN, SHORT














RESISTORS AgRI, A9R2, AIORI, AIOR2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 32V73AI2AIA9RI, 32V73AI2AIAgR2, 32V73AI2AIAIORI,
32V73AI2AIAIOR2
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDE CURRENT ISOLATION BETWEEN FC H20 LINE HTR
SWITCH ($9) AND MDM OF4, AND BETWEEN FC H20 RELIEF HTR SWITCH




REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-164
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2163 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTORS, 5.1 K OHM, 1/4 W
FAILURE MODE: PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]





CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDE CURRE_NT ISO_TION BETWEEN FC H20 LINEHTR ......
SWITCH ($9) AND MDM OF4, AND BETWEEN FC H20 RELIEF HTR SWITCH







































DIODE, 1 AMP ISOLATION
OPEN













DIODES AICR50, AICR51, AICR52, AICR53
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26AICR50, 40V76A26AICR51, 40V76A26AICR52,
40V76A26AICR53
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES CIRCUIT ISOLATION BETWEEN COMMANDS CONTROLLING
HDC'S AR5 AND AR36 WHICH PROVIDE POWER TO STDBY NOZZLE HTR.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF STDBY NOZZLE HTR. NO EFFECT UNLESS FAILURE OF




REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-166
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: DIODE, 1 AMP ISOLATION
FAILURE MODE: SHORT (DOES NOT BLOCK)














DIODES AICRS0, AICRSI, AICR52, AICR53
CRITICALITIES


















CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES CIRCUIT ISOLATION BETWEEN COMMANDS CONTROLLING















































DIODE, 1 AMP ISOLATION
OPEN














DIODES AICR52, AICR53, AICR55
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS MDM INPUT AND PROVIDES CIRCUIT ISOLATION





REPORT DATE 12/18/86 C-168
iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















DIODE, 1 AMP ISOLATION
SHORT (DOES NOT BLOCK)










3) PCA-1 & 2




FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] cC ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25AICR52, 40V76A25AICR53, 40V76A26AICR55
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATi0NA_E: _:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS MDM INPUT AND PROVIDES CIRCUIT ISOLATION





























































RESISTOR AIR29, AIR30, AIR29
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3







CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES CURRENT ISOLATION AND LIMITING BETWEEN H20
NOZZLE HTR TEMPERATURE CONTROLLERS AND MDM'S.
EFFECTS: NONE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-170
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2169 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K
FAILURE MODE: PARAMETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TOLERANCE, LO-RESIST




3) PCA-I & 2







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3_
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3 _I
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ ] SC ) C[ ]
LOCATION[ .......4OV76A25A!R29_4QV76A25AIR304QV76A26AIR29 _
PART NUMBER: RLR07C512GR _, _ _ _
CAUSES:
SHOCK
CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES CURRENT ISOLATION_D LIMITING BETWEEN H20

















































OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS INPUT POWER AND PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION
FOR THE HDC AR5 AND PRIMARY HTR ELEMENT OF H20 RELIEF VLV #i HTR.




REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-172
INDEPENDENTORBITERASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_C
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2171 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR5
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT


















CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..... .........
_CTIQN: PROVIDES FOR REMOTE CQNTROL............. OF POWER TO PRIMARY HTR _
ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF HTR.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF PRIMARY HTR ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF HTR.
REDUNDANCY IN SECONDARY HTR ELEMENTS SO MULTIPLE FAILURES WOULD



































HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR5
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES FOR REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO PRIMARY HTR
ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF HTR.
EFFECTS: NONE.
REFERENCES:












ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP .............
FAILURE MODE: OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/iR AOA: 2/iR
DEORB_[T: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3






CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS INPUT POWER AND PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION
FOR THE HDC AR44 AND SECONDARY HTR ELEMENT OF H20 RELIEF VALVE #i
HTR.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF SECONDARY H20 RELIEF VALVE #I HTR. POSSIBLE



















REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-175
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 2174 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR44
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTANTLY
OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES FOR REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO SECONDARY HTR
ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF HTR.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF SECONDARY HTR ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF HTR.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF FC BY FLOODING WITH EXCESS H20.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-176
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2175 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR44
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS
PREMATURELY












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3 _
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 ....





B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE=
FUNCTION: _P_O_FOR REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO SECONDARY HTR














































OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS











SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
o
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS INPUT POWER AND PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION
FOR THE HDC AR39 AND PRIMARY HTR ELEMENTS OF H20 RELIEF VALVE #2
HTR.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF PRIMARY H20 RELIEF VALVE #2 HTR. REDUNDANCY IN
SECONDARY HTR'S.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-178
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2177 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III A/_39
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND





























CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUC_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATiONALE
FUNCTION: PROVIDES FOR REMOTECONTROL oF POWER TO PRIMARY HTR
E_MENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF _.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF PRIMARY HTR ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF HTR VALVE
IN FC NO 2. REDUNDANCY IN SECONDARY HTR AND MULTIPLE FC'S SO




































HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR39
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES FOR REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO PRIMARY HTR
ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF HTR.
EFFECTS: NONE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-180
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 2179 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP
FAILURE MODE: OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26F8
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0300
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
_CTION: CONDUCTS INPUT PO_RAND PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION
FOR _HE_H_D_C_40 AND SEECON_DARY HTR ELEMENT OF H20 RELIEF VALVE
#2 HTR.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF SECONDARY H20 RELIEF VALVE #2 HTR. POSSIBLE


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 2180 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR40
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26AR40
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES FOR REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO SECONDARY HTR
ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF HTR.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF SECONDARY HTR ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF HTR
VALVE IN FC NO 2. POSSIBLE LOSS OF FC DUE TO FLOODING BY EXCESS
H20.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-182
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLT._.R TYPE III AR40
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS














8 ) WRS i
9) 05-6MA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





MUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE ......... _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
_CTION: PROVIDES FOR _MOTE CONTROL OF PO_R TO SECONDARY HTR









































OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS INPUT POWER AND PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION
FOR THE HDC AR25 AND PRIMARY HTR ELEMENT OF H20 RELIEF VALVE #3
HTR.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF PRIMARY H20 RELIEF VALVE #3 HTR. REDUNDANCY IN
SECONDARY HTR'S.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-184
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 2183 ABORT:
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR25
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R _ TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/ 1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3









ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF HTR.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF PRIMARY HTR ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF HTR FOR
FCNO_ _D_DANCY IN_O]_DAR_R ELEMENTS S_MULTIPLE












































HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR25
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES FOR REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO PRIMARY HTR
ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF HTR.
EFFECTS: NONE.
REFERENCES:












ITEM: FUSE, 3 AMP _ _
FAILURE MODE: OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
















CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL ....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS INPUT POWER AND PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION
FOR THE HDC AR6 AND SECONDARY HTR ELEMENT OF H20 RELIEF VALVE #3
HTR.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF SECONDARY H20 RELIEF VALVE #3 HTR. POSSIBLE


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 2186 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR6
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBI T: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES FOR REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO SECONDARY HTR
ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF HTR.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF SECONDARY HTR ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF HTR FOR
FC NO 3. POSSIBLE LOSS OF FC BY FLOODING WITH EXCESS PRODUCT
H20.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-188
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR6
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A27AR6
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES FOR REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO SECONDARY HTR













































OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR





A[ 1 ] B[P] C [P]
40V76A25F4, 40V76A26F4
ME451-0018-0300
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS INPUT POWER AND PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION
FOR THE HDC AR6 AND PRIMARY AND SECONDARY H20 RELIEF HTR.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF RELIEF VALVE HTR CAPABILITY IN EITHER THE
PRIMARY OR SECONDARY MODE.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-190
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2189 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DEVICE CONTROLLER TYPE III AR6
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/iR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3






CAUSES: ....THE_A _ STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _i_ii_?_ _i _i_i_:_i_c_ i
FUNCTION: PROVIDES FOR REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO PRIMARY HTR
ELEMENTS OF THE_H_O_LIE?_. ...................._ii
EFFECTS: LOSS OF PRIMARY H2ORELIEF VLV HTRELEMENT. REDUNDANCY
IN SECONDARY HTRS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF


























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET






HYBRID DEVICE CONTROLLER TYPE III AR6
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT_ 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25AR6
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES FOR REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO SECONDARY HTR






REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-192
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: !1/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 2191 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DEVICE CONTROLLER TYPE III AR6
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTANTLY
OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND













8 ) WRS --
9) 05-6MA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3







CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONA_:
ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF HTR.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF SECONDARY H20 RELIEF VLV HTR ELEMENTS. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LOSS OF ALL POWER NEEDED TO HEAT VENT





















HYBRID DEVICE CONTROLLER TYPE III AR6
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS
























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: 40V76A26AR6
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-002
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES FOR REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO PRIMARY HTR
ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF HTR.
EFFECTS: NONE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-194
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
















OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25F42, 40V76A26FI2
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS INPUT POWER AND PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION
FOR HDCIS 37 AND PRIMARY AND SECONDARY HTR ELEMENTS OF FC 1,2,3
BARREL HEATER.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF EITHER PRIMARY OR SECONDARY BARREL HEATER
































ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2194 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR37
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/!R
ONORBIT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/ 1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES FOR REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER TO PRIMARY &
SECONDARY HTR ELEMENTS OF THE WATER BARREL HEATER.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF EITHER PRIMARY OR SECONDARY HTR ELEMENTS OF THE
H20 BARREL HEATER. REDUNDANCY IN SECONDARY HTR ELEMENTS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-196
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR37
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]. B [
LOCATION: 4OV76A25AR37, _-4_V76A26AR37
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-002
] c [ ]
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUC_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ...................... _ _



































OPEN - INADVERTENTLY OPENS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,
CONTAMINATION, DEGRADED MATERIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: CONDUCTS INPUT POWER AND PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION
FOR HDC'S ARS AND AR36 AND PRIMARY HTR ELEMENTS OF NOZZLE HEATER.
EFFECTS: LOSS PRIMARY HTR ELEMENTS OF NOZZLE HEATER. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO DUMP EXCESS PRODUCT H20.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-198
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 2197 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR5, AR36
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
OPEN, SHORTS TO GROUND















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/ 1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RAT!0NALE'_ _:_ _ir:_ii_ : _i: :_: :: _:_ ::::::
FUNCTION: PROVIDES FOR REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER FOR HTR ELEMENT OF
FC H20 NOZZLE HTR.
EFFECTS: LOSS OF ABILITYY TO DUMP H20 OVERBOARD WHEN NOZZLE































HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER TYPE III AR5, AR36
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUNCTION: PROVIDES FOR REMOTE CONTROL OF POWER FOR HTR ELEMENT OF
FC H20 NOZZLE HTR.





REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-200
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT































THERMAL SWITCHES 172, 171, 272, 271, 372, 371
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORB IT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR ....
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
_LOCATION: 40V4STS171, 172 (REF)
PART NUMBER: MC452-0147
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTROLS PRODUCT WATER LINE HTR ELEMENTS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF


















REFERENCES: ALSO THERMAL SWITCHES 272, 271, 372, 371 g
I

















FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED













THERMAL SWITCHES 172, 171, 272, 271, 372, 371
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LI FTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3











REFERENCES: ALSO THERMAL SWITCHES 272, 271, 372, 371
-w
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-202
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMEN_






























TIE BAR 8, 9
THERMAL SWITCH 170, 270, 370, 072
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL:
ONORBI T: 3/ 1R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3














STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTROLS H20 RELIEF VALVES PRIMARY HEATER ELEMENTS AND PRIMARY ....
HEATER ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF VENT LINE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF










































FAILURE MODE: FAILS CLOSED













TIE BAR 8, 9
THERMAL SWITCH 170, 270, 370, 072
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:








REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:








































TIE BAR 8, 9


























STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTROLS H20 RELIEF VALVES STANDBY HEATER ELEMENTS AND STANDBY --
HEATER ELEMENTS OF THE H20 RELIEF VENT LINE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
























































TIE BAR 8, 9
THERMAL SWITCH 170, 270, 370, 071
CRITICALITIES











REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: 40V45MTI70, 270, 370, 071
PART NUMBER: MC452-0147
] c [ ]
CAUSES:
SHOCK





REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-206
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 2205 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER AR49, AR49
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENT OPEN














TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER AR49, AR49
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 40V76A25AR49, 6AR49
PART NUMBER: MC450-0062-0002
B IF] C [P]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FC PRODUCT H20 OVERBOARD DUMP NOZZLE HEATER LOGIC.
















































TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER AR49, AR49
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY














TEMPERATURE CONTROLLER AR49, AR49
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF FC PRODUCT H20 OVERBOARD DUMP NOZZLE HEATER LOGIC.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF FUNCTION AND EVENTUAL LOSS OF FCP.
w REFERENCES:

















FCP 1,2,3 HTR PWR ON IND. 5.1K RESISTOR
OPEN, ELEMENT OPENS, HIGH RESIST










3) TERM BD. 40TBI3V, 135, 136
RESISTOR, MODULE ASSY 5.1K OHMS
05-6MA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
THE_AL STRESS =.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT SIGNAL FOR FCP END CELL HTR STATUS. LOSS OF








































SWITCH, FUEL CELL i, 2, 3 REACT_S
FAIL TO TRANSFER, FAIL TO CONDUCT, FAIL TO CLOSE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORB IT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .......
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE REACTANT SUPPLY VALVES. POSSIBLE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO SHUTDOWN REACTANTS TO A FCP IF NECESSARY. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE WITH FAILURE TO SHUTDOWN A FCP.
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-209
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















SWITCH, FUEL CELL I, 2, 3 REACTANTS
SHORTS, INADVERTENTLY CLOSES














SWITCH, SI, $7, $4
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE LOSS OF FCP WITH THE INADVERTENT SHUTDOWN OF REACTANT


































SWITCH, H2 TANK 1-4 PRIMARY HEATER CONTROL
FAIL TO TRANSFER, FAIL TO CONDUCT, FAIL TO CLOSE




3) PNL RIA2, ALIA1


















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIA2SII, 19, 24, (REF)
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7306
c[P]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY H2 TANK HEATER ELEMENTS. REDUNDANCY IN SECONDARY
HTRS.
REFERENCES: ALSO AIIAIS4












ITEM: SWITCH, H2 TANK 1-4 PRIMARY HEATER CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS, INADVERTENTLY C_SES




3) PNL RIA2, AIIAI
























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIA2SII, 19, 24, (REF)
ME452-0102-7306 : ........
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONA_ :
INABILITY TO CONTROL HEATING OF H2 TANK. FAILURE OF TANK DUE TO




























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/25/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 2225 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: SWITCH, H2 TANK 1-4 STANDBY HEATER CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO TRANSFER, FAIL TO CONDUCT, FAIL TO CLOSE




3) PNL RIA2, ALIA1







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIA2S12, 20, 25, (REF)
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7306
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF SECONDARY H2 TANK HEATER ELEMENTS. LOSS OF H2 TANK DUE
TO INSUFFICIENT HEATING. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO
LOSS OF FCP REACTANTS AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF FUEL CELL.
REFERENCES: ALSO AIIAIS5
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-213
DINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















SWITCH, H2 TANK 1-4 STANDBY HEATER CONTROL
SHORTS, INADVERTENTLY CLOSES




3) PNL RIA2, ALIA1







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: 3/3
DEORBI T: I/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: i/i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIA2S12, 20, 25, (REF)
ME452-0102-7306
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO CONTROL HEATING OF H2 TANK. FAILURE OF TANK DUE TO
OVERPRESSURIZATION. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO EVENTUAL
































SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 TEST/RESET CONTROL
FAIL TO TRANSFER, FAIL TO CONDUCT, FAIL TO CLOSE




3) PNL RIA2, AllAI







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIA2SI0, 15, 23, (REF)
ME452-0102-7205
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO TEST AND RESET CIRCUITRY FOR THE 02 TANKS.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF 02 TANK. POSSIBLE LOSS OF FUEL CELL DUE TO LOSS
OF REACTANTS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ALSO 36V73AIIAIS3
l
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-215
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT












SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 TEST/RESET CONTROL
SHORTS, INADVERTENTLY CLOSES




3) PNL RIA2, AliA1


















REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]










LOSS OF ABILITY TO TEST AND RESET CURRENT LEVEL DETECTORS. SHORT

















REFERENCES: ALSO 36V73AIIAIS3 B
l
m













SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 PRIMARY HEATER CONTROL
FAIL TO TRANSFER, FAIL TO CONDUCT, FAIL TO CLOSE




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIA2S8, 13, 21 (REF)
ME452-0102-7306
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRIMARY 02 TANK HEATER ELEMENTS. REDUNDANCY IN STANDBY
HEATERS. MULTIPLE FAILURES WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR BEFORE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: ALSO 36V73AIIAISI
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-217
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT















SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 PRIMARY HEATER CONTROL
SHORTS, INADVERTENTLY CLOSES



























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIA2S8, 13, 21 (REF)
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7306
c[P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO CONTROL HEATING OF 02 TANK. FAILURE OF TANK DUE TO



























ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 2231 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 STANDBY HEATER CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: FAIL TO TRANSFER, FAIL TO CONDUCT, FAIL TO CLOSE




3) PNL RIA2, AllA1







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
32V73AIA2Sg, 14, 22 (REF)
ME452"0102-7306
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF STANDBY 02 TANK HEATER ELEMENTS. LOSS OF 02 TANK DUE TO
INSUFFICIENT HEATING. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AFTER LOSS
OF ASSOCIATED FCP..
REFERENCES: ALSO 36V73AIIAIS2
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-219
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










ITEM: SWITCH, 02 TANK 1-4 STANDBY HEATER CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS, INADVERTANTLY CLOSES




3) PNL RIA2, ALIA1







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
•LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBI T: 1/1 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: i/1
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: 32V73AIA2S9, 14, 22 (REF)
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102-7306
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, SHOCK,VIBRATION'STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO CONTROL HEATING OF 02 TANK. LOSS OF TANK DUE TO _





































ITEM: RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2 WATT
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, ELEMENT OPENS














RESISTORS A2RI, RII, RI2, A2R2, RI0
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3







CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPERATE THE 02 AND H2 FCP SUPPLY VALVES.




REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-221
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









RESISTORS, 1.2 KOHM, 2 WATT
P_ETER DEVIATION, OUT OF TO_CE, _-_SIST














RESISTORS A2RI, RII, RI2, A2R2, RI0
CRITICALITIES











_DUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATI ON:
P_T NUMBER:





































REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER IOA
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBI T: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES POWER TO 02 TANK HEATERS. REDUNDANCY IN SECONDARY HTRS.
ADDITIONAL FAILURE WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR BEFORE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: 40V76AI41RPC5 THRU 12, 2RPC5 THRU 12, 3RPc5 THRU 12,
4RPC5 THRU 12
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-223
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT









REMOTE PO_R CONTROLT._.R IOA
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS, CONDUCTS P_MA_ELY












FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
_DING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUC_L FAILU_, CONTAMINATION, MEC_I_L SHOCK,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONATR:
PROVIDES POWER TO 02 TANK HEATERS. ONE SERIES RPC FAIL_ WILL
NOT CAUSE OVEREATING. DUAL FAIL_S WI_ mUSE OVEREATING AND
_SS OF 02 BY CONTI_OUSLY POURING _ATER E_MENT.
_FE_NCES: 40V76AI41RPC5 T_U 12, 2RPC5 T_U 12, 3RPC5 T_U 12,







































REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER 5A
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY




























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ I ]
LOCATION: REF
PART NUMBER: MC450-0017-I050
B [ P] c[P]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES POWER TO H2 TANK HEATERS. LOSS OF H2 TANK DUE TO
INSUFFICIENT HEATING OF TANK. REDUNDANCY IN SECONDARY HEATERS.
REFERENCES:
4RPCI THRU 4
40V76AI41RPCI THRU 4, 2RPCI THRU 4, 3RPCI THRU 4,
m
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-225
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT









_MOTE POWER CONTROL_R 5A
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS, CONDUCTS P_MA_LY












FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
_DING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUC_L FAIL_, CONTAMINATION, MEC_I_L SHOCK,
_E_AL sHocK,-_B_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
PROVIDES PO_R TO H2 T_K HEATERS. FAIL_ OF _O RPC'S IN
SERIES WILL CAUSE CONTI_OUS HEATING OF H2 T_K _D _SS OF H2
T_K. POSSIB_ _SS OF C_W/VEHIC_.
_FE_NCES:
4RPC1 T_U 4








































HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, FUEL CELL 1,2,3, OPEN
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO CONDUCT INADVERTENTLY












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO ASSOCIATED F/C SUPPLY VALVE. ADDITONAL FAILURE

















HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, FUEL CELL 1,2,3, OPEN
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ........
PROVIDES POWER TO FC SUPPLY VALVES. ONE SERIES HDC FAILURE WILL
NOT CAUSE LOSS OF FUNCTION. DUAL FAILURES PREVENT THE OPENING OF















































HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, FUEL CELL 1,2,3, CLOSE
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBI T: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBI T: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF POWER TO ASSOCIATED F/C CLOSE SUPPLY VALVE. ADDITIONAL
FAILURE WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR BEFORE LOSS OF ABILITY TO CLOSE






REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-229
IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT











HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, FUEL CELL 1,2,3, CLOSE
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/1 R
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [P]
LOCATION: (REF)
PART NUMBER: MC477-0263-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ...................
PROVIDES POWER TO FC c_SE VALVES. 6NE_-SERIES HDC_FAILURE WiLL-
NOT CAUSE LOSS OF FUNCTION. DUAL FAILURES PREVENT THE CLOSURE OF
VALVE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INABILITY TO






















































OPEN, FAILS OPEN, FAILS TO CONDUCT
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3







CONTAMINATION, THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPEN OR CLOSE A FCP REACTANT VALVE. POSSIBLE




















SHORTS, INTERNAL SHORT (DOES NOT BLOCK)


























REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: (REF)
PART NUMBER: JANTXVIN4246
CAUSES: THE_KT. STRESS, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NONE.
- -_ -_-i_ _ 'i " ....... _..............




































HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, 02 HTR A&B CONTROL
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. PATTON SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) EPG
2) PRS D S








FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES POWER TO RPC'S CONTROLLING 02 TANK HEATERS.



















HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, 02 HTR A&B CONTROL
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS











FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LI FTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORBI T: 2/1R AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE CO NT_OUSHEATINGOF 02TANK HTR ELEMENT. DUAL
FAILURES _AUS_HDC'S TOEN-ERG_Z_HTR. PosSIBLE DAMAGEAND LOSS _







































HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, 02 HTR A&B INHIBIT
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO CONDUCT, INADVERTENTLY












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBI T: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF CIRCUITRY TO INHIBIT 02 TANK HTR. REDUNDANT HTR
CIRCUITS AVAILABLE. ADDITIONAL FAILURE WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR
BEFORE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. POSSIBLE CONTINUOUS HEATING OF 02
TANK.
REFERENCES: 40V76AI41ARI3,15, 2 O,22, 2ARI3,15, 20,22,
3ARI3,15,20,22, 4ARI3,15,20,22
m
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-235
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










HYBRID DRIVER CONTROLLER, 02 HTR A&B INHIBIT
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, SHORTS INTERNALLY, CONDUCTS























3/3 _ _ =





CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HTR CONTROL CIRCUITRY INHIBITED BY LATCHING HDC. POSSIBLE LOSS
OF ONE HTRELEMENT OF O2 TANK_ ......RED_D_T H EATERAVA_I_LABLE_
CONTINUOUS HEATING OF TANK POSSIBLE WITH LOSS OF TANK AND
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.












































CURRENT LEVEL DETECTOR, 02 TANK HTR
LOSS OF OUTPUT, INADVERTENTLY OPENS, FAILS TO




3) H2/02 CONTROL BOX 1,2,3,4







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
02 TANKS 1 THRU 4
MC431-0137-0001
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DUAL FAILURES WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR BEFORE CONTINUOUSLY ENERGIZING



















CU_NT LEVEL DETECTOR, 02 TANK HTR

















H2/O2 CONTROL BOX 1,2,3,4
CURRENT LEVEL DETECTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBI T: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORB iT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: 02 TANKS 1 THRU 4
PART NUMBER: MC431-0137-0001
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, THERMAL STRESS,
VIBRATION_ _ ............_i_ ....._.... ___- _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF 02 TANK HTR SHORT PROTECTION. LOSS OF ABILITY TO INHIBIT
ASSOCIATED 02 TANK HEATER CIRCUITRY. POSSIBLE LOSS OF TANK DUE






































ITEM: 02 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VLV CNTL CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF POWER, SHORTS TO GND















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO ISOLATE SUBASSY #I. POSSIBLE DEGRADATION OF
FC 2 AND 3. VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN DURING FLIGHT. pOSSIBLE LOSS
OF FCP AND LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-239
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2254 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: 02 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VLV CNTL CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY, INTERNAL
SHORT, FAILS TO CLOSE




3) PNL RIA2/MID PCAI






FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LI FTOFF: 3/ IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL rSHOCK,
THERMAL S_SS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:o--zI_I_II I_[IL _....................................................
MULTIPLE FAILURES WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR BEFORE LOSS OF ALL







































H2 GSE SUPPLY VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF POWER, INADVERTENT OPEN,












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3










REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-241
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2256 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: H2 GSE SUP_Y VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY, INTERNAL
SHORT, FAILS TO CLOSE












FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3 _,_
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: SHEET 3 .....
PART NUMBER: VS70-450212












































02 GSE SUPPLY VALVE CONTROL CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF POWER, INADVERTENT OPEN












MID PCA NO. 1
CIRCUIT, VALVE CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONOREIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: SHEET 3
PART NUMBER: VS70-450212





REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-243
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT










02 GSE SUPPLY VALVE CONTROL CIR_IT
INADVERTENT OUTPUT, CONDUCTS P_MA_LY, INTE_AL
7._AD _ALYST: J. PATTON SUBSYS _._.AD: K. SC_ECKPEPER
B_DO_ HIE_CHY:
I) EPG
2 ) PRS DS
3) MID PCA NO. 1




























B C ] C [ ]






















REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-244
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT















02 PRIMARY ECLSS VALVE #I SUPPLY SYS.
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF POWER














SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/ 1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPEN OR CLOSE 02 SYSTEM #i (PRIMARY) 02 SUPPLY
VALVE TO PROVIDE 02 TO ECLSS. REDUNDANCY IN SECONDARY ECLSS 02
VALVE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLEDUE TO LOSS OF 02 AND
ASSOCIATED FCP.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-245
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2260 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: 02 PRIMLY ECLSS VALVE #i SUPPLY SYS.
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY, INTERNAL
SHORT






























B [ P] C [P]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
THE_AL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIO_ALE:_ ........____ ...........
DUAL FAILURE WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR BEFORE _MATURE OPERATION,_;_ _
VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN DURING FLIGHT. CREW CONTROL WILL RESET
FAILURE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO LACK OF SUFFICIENT


































H2 MANIFOLD 2 ISOLATION VLV CNTL CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF POWER, SHORTS TO GND















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3




CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO ISOLATE SUBASSY #i. VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN
DURING FLIGHT. POSSIBLE DEGRADATION OF FC 2 AND 3. POSSIBLE LOSS
OF FCP AND LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-247
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/F_C
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2262 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: H2 _IFOLD 2 ISO_TION VLV CNTL CIR_IT
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT, CONDUCTS P_MA_LY, INTE_AL
SHORT, FAI_ TO C_SE
• _ :- _ _




3) PNL RIA2/MID PCA2






FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/_C
P__CH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/ IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
_DING/SAFING: 3/3





mUSES: STRUC_L FAIL_, CO_AMINATION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK,
THE_AL S_SS
EFFE_S/_TIONAT._- :
ADDITIONAL FAIL_ WOULD _VE TO OC_ BEFO_ _SS OF ALL
_D_D_CY. DEG_DATION OF FCP 2 _D FCP 3. _ ACTION





































ITEM: H2 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VLV CNTL CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF POWER, SHORT TO GND
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/ IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
VALVE NORMALLY OPEN DURING FLIGHT. LOSS OF ABILITY TO ISOLATE
SUB ASSY #2. POSSIBLE LOSS OF FCP AND LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-249
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2264 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: H2 MANIFOLD 1 ISOLATION VLV CNTL CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY, INTERNAL
SHORT, FAILS TO CLOSE
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: _ _..................................
ADDITIONAL FAILURE WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR BEFORE LOSS OF ALL































ITEM: 02 MANIFOLD 2 ISOL VLV CONTROL CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF POWER, SHORT TO GND















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO ISOLATE SUBASSY #1. POSSIBLE DEGRADATION OF
FC 2 AND 3. VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN DURING FLIGHT. POSSIBLE LOSS
OF FCP AND LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-251
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2266 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: 02 MANIFOLD 2 ISOL VLV CONTROL CIRCUIT ....
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY, INTERNAL
SHORT, FAILS TO CLOSE














FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RTLS: 3/!R
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [P] C [ P]
LOCATION: SHEET 1
PART NUMBER: VS70-450212
CAUSES: _ STRUC_L-FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
THERMAL S_SS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:!_j_I! r _ _ _ _ _ /!ii i i_i_
ADDITIONAL FAIL_-WOULD_VE TO OCCUR BEFORE LOSS OF ALL










































FCP 1 REACTANT VLV CNTL CIRCUIT
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF POWER, SHORT TO GND




3) PNL RIA2/MID PCAI







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION THROUGH PWR, CNTL AND
TKBK CIRCUIT. VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN DURING FLIGHT. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-253
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C F-L-IGH-T: 3/I-R
MDAC ID: 2268 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: FCP 1 REACTANT VLV CNTL CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY, INTERNAL
SHORT, FAIL TO CLOSE




3) PNL RIA2/MID PCAI



























CAusEs: _: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MEc_IcAL SHOCK,
THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:_ --_ i_ _--_- -_ii_v:_c_i! : _ ;_
ADDITINAL FAILURE MUST OCCUR BEFORE INITIATION OF FUNCTION. CREW












































FCP 2 REACTANT VLV CNTL CKT
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF POWER, SHORT TO GND















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION THROUGH PWR, CNTRL AND
TKBK CIRCUIT. VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN DURING FLIGHT. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-255
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: ii/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2270 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: FCP 2 REACTANT VLV CNTL CKT
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY, INTERNAL
SHORT, FAIL TO CLOSE
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/1R
ONORBI T: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBI T: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: .....STR-UC_L FAIL_E_/_CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, _
THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :_ _ _ _ _ _!_!_ _!ili_<i...._.__ _ ...._ _z_
ADDITIONAL FAILURE MUST_CCUR BEFO_iNITIATION OF FUNCTION'







































ITEM: FCP 3 REACTANT VLV CNTL CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF POWER, SHORT TO GND




3) PNL RIA2/MID PCA3







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/IR TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO MONITOR VALVE POSITION THROUGH PWR, CNTL AND
TKBK CIRCUIT. VALVE IS NORMALLY OPEN DURING FLIGHT. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-257
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2272 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: FCP 3 REAcT_T VLV CNTL CIRCUIT ....
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY, INTERNAL
SHORT, FAIL TO CLOSE




3) PNL RIA2/MID PCA3
























CAUSES "_ STRUC_L FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:_-_!__:_ _:_...._: .... i:_ _ .....
ADDITIONAL?-A_MUST 0C_BEFO_ iNITIATION OF FUNCTION. _



































ITEM: 02 SECONDARY ECLSS VLV NO. 2 SUPPLY SYS
FAILURE MODE: OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF POWER, SHORT TO GND




3) PNL L2AI/MID PCA2







FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LI FTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO OPEN OR CLOSE 02 SYSTEM #2 (SECONDARY) 02
SUPPLY VALVE TO PROVIDE 02 TO ECLSS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF






REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-259
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 2274 ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM: 02 SECONDARY ECLSS VLV NO. 2 SUPPLY SYS
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY, INTERNAL
SHORT, FAIL TO CLOSE
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS :














CAUSES: _STRUC_L FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK_ _--_
THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:_ _= .............. _=_ _......_ _.=_
DUAL FAILURE WOULD HAVE TO OCCUR BEFORE PREMATURE OPERATION.
CREW CONTROL CAN RESET FAILURE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES:











































H2 HEATER A&B CONTROL CIRCUITS
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF POWER
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ i ]
LOCATION: SHEETS 5 THRU 8
PART NUMBER: VS70-450212
B[P] C[P]
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO CONTROL HTRS IN H2 TANKS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INSUFFICIENT HEATING OF H2 TANK AND EVENTUAL
LOSS OF REACTANTS. REDUNDANCY IN SECONDARY HEATERS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-261
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_C
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLI G-HT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 2276 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: H2 HEATER A&B coNTROL CIRCUITS
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPEN, CONDUCTS PREMATURELY, INTERNAL
SHORT, FAILS CLOSE
















FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: 3/1R TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SHEETS 5 THRU 8
VS70-450212
CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TANK NORMALLY OPERATED IN "AUTO" MODE. MANUAL CON_0L BY CREW _
WHEN "AUTO" FAILS. HEATERS ARE PREVENTED FROM OVERHEATING AND
TANKS HAVE MECHANICALRELIEF VALVE FOR OVERPRESSURIZATION









































02 HEATER A&B CONTROL CIRCUITS
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF POWER













PNL RIA2/H2/O2 CONT BOX
CIRCUIT, HEATER CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUIqCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3





CAUSES: STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
THERMAL STRESS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ABILITY TO CONTROL HTRS IN 02 TANKS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO INSUFFICIENT HEATING OF 02 TANK AND EVENTUAL
LOSS OF REACTANTS. REDUNDANCY IN SECONDARY HTRS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/17/86 C-263
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/28/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_NC
SUBSYSTEM: EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/1R
MDAC ID: 2278 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: 02 HEATER A&B CONTROL CIR_ITS
FAIL_ MODE: INADVERTENT OUTPUT, CONDUCTS PREMA_RELY, INTE_AL
SHORT, FAI_ CLOSE




3) PNL R_2/H2/O2 CONT BOX
























CAUSES: .....STRUCTURAL FKILURE, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCKr
THE_AL ST_SS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NORMAL-6PE--_TING MODE IS"AUTO". CREW MAY _SE_TMANUAL CON_OL
OF HEATERS AFTER FIRST FAILURE. HEATERS ARE INHIBITED FROM
OVERHEATING AND PROTECTED BY OVERPRESSURIZATION BY RELIEF VALVE.



























































FC GPC PURGE SWITCH
ISOLATION RESISTOR
FC PURGE HTR SWITCH
ISOLATION RESISTOR
GPC PURGE STATUS DIODE
GPC PURGE STATUS DIODE
FC 1 PUMP MOTOR CIRCUIT
BREAKER
FC 2 PUMP MOTOR CIRCUIT
BREAKER
FC 3 PUMP MOTOR CIRCUIT
BREAKER
GPC AUTO PURGE FUSE
GPC AUTO PURGE FUSE
FPC PURGE VALVE
ISOLATION DIODES
FC CONTROL PWR CKT FUSE
FC COOLANT PUMP/H2 PUMP
HDC
FC COOLANT PUMP/H2 PUMP
DIODE
FCI H20 LINE HTR FUSE
FCI H20 LINE HTR HDC
FC2 H20 LINE HTR FUSE
FC2 H20 LINE HTR HDC
FC3 H20 LINE HTR FUSE
FC3 H20 LINE HTR HDC
FC H20 RELIEF HTR FUSE
FC H20 RELIEF HTR SWITCH
H20 RELIEF VLV 1 HTR FUSE


























































































H20 RELIEF VLV 2 HTR FUSE
H20 RELIEF VLV 2 HTR HDC
H20 RELIEF VLV 3 HTR FUSE
H20 RELIEF VLV 3 HTR HDC
H20 RELIEF VLV HTR HDC
FC H20 NOZZLE HTR HDC
FC H20 NOZZLE HTR HDC
THERMAL SWITCH
FC PRODUCT H20 DUMP
NOZZLE LOGIC TEMP CNTLR
FC PRODUCT H20 DUMP
NOZZLE LOGIC TEMP CNTLR
FC 1,2,3 REACTANT SWITCH
FC 1,2,3 REACTANT SWITCH
H2 PRIM HTR CNTL SWITCH
H2 STDBY HTR CNTL SWITCH
H2 STDBY HTR CNTL SWITCH
02 TK TEST/RESET CNTL
SWITCH
02 PRIM HTR CNTL SWITCH
02 STDBY HTR CNTL SWITCH
02 STDBY HTR CNTL SWITCH
REACT SPPLY VLV RESISTOR
FC 1,2,3 OPEN HDC
REACT SPPLY VLV HDC
FC 1,2,3 CLOSE HDC
FC 1,2,3 CLOSE HDC
FC REACT VLV CLOSE DIODE
02 HTR A & B CNTL HDC
02 MANIFOLD 1 ISOL VALVE
CONTROL CIRCUIT
02 PRIM ECLSS VALVE 1
SUPPLY CONTROL CIRCUIT









LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL
TO CONDUCT
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL
TO CONDUCT
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL
TO CONDUCT





















LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAIL
TO CONDUCT
INADVERTENT OUTPUT





OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF
PWR
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF
PWR










H2 MANIFOLD 11SOL VALVE
CONTROL CIRCUIT
02 MANIFOLD 2 ISOL VALVE
CONTROL CIRCUIT
02 SECONDARY ECLSS VLV 2_
SUPPLY SYSTEM
H2 HTR CNTL CIRCUIT
02 HTR CNTL CIRCUIT
FAILURE MODE
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF
PWR i
OPEN CIRCUIT, LOSS OF PWR
OPEN IT, LOSS OF PWR n
OPEN, LOSS OF POWER
OPEN, LOSS OF POWER
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